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AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE? PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT TRIAL IN ITALY AND THE UNITED
STATES: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND AN
EFFICIENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
by
Rachel A. Van Cleave·

INTRODUCTION

With the jury's verdict in the O.J. Simpson civil case,l questions going to the heart of our criminal justice system have surfaced. Primarily, such questions ask whether the goal of our
system is to discover the truth of a particular crime, or rather to
achieve some form of justice, regardless of whether the truth
necessarily emerges. Where O.J. Simpson was acquitted by a
criminal jury,2 but then found civilly liable for the deaths of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman, it appears to many
that the civil trial was the real search for the truth. 3 Many commentators question the fairness of a system which requires a
criminal defendant who has been acquitted to stand trial again

* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. Stanford
University, 1986; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M.
Stanford Law School, 1994. (Copyright 1997). Research for this article was made possible
by a William J. Fulbright Scholar Grant. Accordingly, I thank Barbara Babcock, Miguel
Mendez, H.G. Prince, and Eric Wright for their support of my application, and the staff of
the Rome, Italy Office of International Exchange of Scholars. In addition, Professors
Giovanni Conso and Tiziana Trevisson Lupacchini were invaluable in their willingness to
discuss my research, and the library staff of the Italian Constitutional Court was extremely patient in answering my many questions. I also thank Timothy W. Floyd and
Charles P. Bubany for helpful comments and suggestions, Wesley Prewitt for research
assistance, and Joseph Schottland for editorial and other support. I nonetheless assume
full responsibility for any errors in translation of or citation to Italian sources.
I
See Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10,
1997); Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10,
1997); and Brown v. Simpson, No. SC036876, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10,
1997).
2 People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
1995).
3 Akil Reed Amar, A Second Chance at Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A25.
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in a civil case or a federal civil rights case. 4 Continental observers are particularly puzzled by these outcomes. 5
Another recent example of this tension between truth and
fairness is the attempt to reopen the case against James Earl
Ray who pled guilty to the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr.
twenty-eight years ago. 6 Significantly, the King family has supported Ray's request for a trial in an effort to determine the
truth about King's assassination. 7 Ray's request adds to the mix
of tensions regarding the need for plea bargains to further efficiency goals, even though the ability to discover the truth may be
compromised.
With such soul-searching occurring in the United States over
the purposes of the criminal justice system, Italy's recent adoption of an overhauled code of criminal procedure provides a
unique opportunity for evaluating the tensions within the United
States system. The 1989 Italian Code of Criminal Procedures
imported certain aspects of our criminal justice system into
Italy's civil law tradition. This Article focuses on the trial-avoid-

4
Yale Kamisar, Call it Double Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at A37 (citing
the O.J. Simpson cases as well as the examples of Lemrick Nelson Jr., who had been
acquitted of state criminal charges but then later convicted in federal court for violating
Yankel Rosenbaum's civil rights, and the Los Angeles police officers, Stacey Koons and
Laurence Powell, who were also acquitted of state criminal charges, but were found guilty
in federal court of violating Rodney King's civil rights).
• Robert Siegel, All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 5,
1997, Transcript No. 97020504-212) ["NPR All Things Considered"] (interview with
George Fletcher, Professor of Law, Columbia University) (noting that in civil law countries criminal and civil cases are joined and tried together, the standard of proof is lower
(preponderance of the evidence), and the same for each. Also noting the prosecutor in a
civil law jurisdiction may appeal a criminal verdict of not guilty).
6
On February 20, 1997, a Shelby County Circuit Judge in Tennesse determined
that there was reason to grant a hearing on the ballistics test of the rifle. See Judge says
Technology Warrants Testing of Rifle in King Murder, THE COM. APPEAL, Feb. 21, 1997,
at AI.
7
Leonard Greene, We Need to Try Ray Now and Let 'Justice Run its Course,' BosTON HERALD, Feb. 26, 1997, at 16; Carl T. Rowan, Ray Deserves a Real Trial, CHI. SUNTIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at 25.
• CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] (Italy). Enacted on September 22, 1988, by
Presidential Decree number 447, the code did not go into effect until October 25, 1989.
Throughout this article it is referred to by 1989, the year it went into effect.
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ance mechanisms which have been dubbed plea bargaining. Examining how a civil law country has "translated" trial-avoidance
mechanisms, thought to be characteristic of the United States
-adversarial model, can further general understanding of our own
system, and specific understanding of the practice of plea bargaining. Before considering these devices in detail, a general
description of the new code is necessary.
Not long after the adoption of its post-World War II Constitution,9 Italy became aware of the conflicts between this document
and the 1930 Code of Criminal Procedure (Codice ROCCO).l0 The
Rocco Code was a product of fascism and reflective of a traditionally inquisitorial criminal justice system.ll In addition, the 1930
Code did not include methods for protecting the guarantees of
individual rights set out in the new constitution. Efforts to reform the Rocco Code began as early as 1965, but were not successful until the adoption of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure. The principal goal of the 1989 Code was to bring Italy's
criminal justice system in line with "liberal democratic political
structures."12 In order to fulfill this goal, Italy sought to adopt
aspects of an "accusatorial" criminal justice system found in
common law countries such as the United States. 13 Many of the
changes focused on opening up the trial stage, thus eliminating
elements of secrecy characteristic of inquisitorial systems. For

COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] [COST. (1948)] (Italy).
CODICE Rocco [C.P.P (1930)] (Italy), Royal Decree No. 1939 of Oct. 19, 1930, No.
251 Gazz. mf., Oct. 26, 1930 ["CODICE Rocco"]. For more information on the 1930 Code,
see G. LEROY CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 220 (1985); Louis F. Del Duca, An
9

10

Historic Conuergence of Ciuil and Common Law Systems-Italy's New "Aduersarial"
Criminal Procedure System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 73, 75·81 (1991).
II
MiIjan Damaska, Euidentiary Barriers to Conuiction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparatiue Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 556 (1973) (describing secrecy
and torture or coercion as characteristics of "criminal proceedings which prevailed in
continental European countries from the thirteenth until the first half of the nineteenth
century").
12 Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Aduersarial
System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245,
245 (1991).
'" Law No. 81 of Feb 16, 1987, 1987 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti della
Repubblica Italiana [Racc. mf.] I 220, art. 2 (LEGGE DELEGA) (Italy).
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example, the new Italian Code adopted the principles of "orality"14 (live testimony) and "publicity"15 of criminal trials, judicial impartiality/6 and the techniques of direct and cross-examination of witnesses by the parties. 17 In addition, the new code
imposed greater restrictions on the admission of evidence from
the prosecutor's dossier at trial. l8 Each of these changes regarding the trial stage have made the trial itself more complicated
and time-consuming, thus creating the risk of a tremendous
backlog of criminal cases.
Along with changes in the trial, the new code effected the
significant structural change of abolishing the giudice istruttore
(investigative judge)19 who previously was responsible for investigating the crime, evaluating the evidence, and rendering a decision. The 1989 Code instead divides up these functions, allocating them to different players and to different phases of the criminal process,20 thus altering the roles of the prosecutors and defense attorneys. These structural changes also threatened to
slow down the processing of cases. Recognizing these likely effects, the delegating legislation included alternative methods for
disposing of cases, to streamline the system, unclog the courts,
and ensure a speedy disposition of cases. 21 However, the devices

'4 Id., art. 2, directive 2 (adoption of the oral method).
" C.P.P. art. 471 (providing that trials shall be public; if not, they are null).
'" C.P.P. arts. 37-44 (providing strict recusal rules to ensure the impartiality of the
judge).
'7
C.P.P. art. 498 (providing for direct examination of a witness by the party who
called the witness, followed by cross-examination by the other party).
to
C.P.P. art. 431 (listing the evidence from the prosecutor's file which will accompanying the judge's decision to bind the case over for trial) & art. 433 (stating that any
other evidence in the prosecutor's dossier is to be returned to the prosecutor).
'9 C.P.P. arts. 347-357 (listing the investigative activities of the judicial police), and
arts. 358-378 (listing the investigative activities of the prosecutor). There is no longer any
mention of the investigative judge. However, the 1989 Code created the judge presiding
over the preliminary investigations (giudice per Ie irulagini preliminari) who supervises
the investigations, decides the appropriateness of preventative detention of the defendant
before trial, and conducts any preliminary hearings.
20
Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (1989).
2' 81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directives 43 & 44 (Italy) (providing for
"direct trial" and "immediate trial," respectively, skipping the preliminary hearing, pro-

1997]

AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE?

423

adopted for disposing of criminal cases without trial have collided with the deeply rooted goal of ascertaining the truth in a
criminal case.
This Article compares the steps taken by Italy and the United
States22 to reconcile the need for an efficient criminal justice .
system on the one hand, and the desire to achieve justice or
discover the truth on the other.23 Plea bargaining in the United
States has a significant history and has generated a substantial
amount of literature critical of the device as violative of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights, particularly the right to be
tried by a jury of one's peers.24 In addition, scholars have criticized the distortive effect of plea bargaining on the roles of the
prosecutor/5 judge,26 and defense counsel.27 Similarly, the triceeding directly to trial), directives 45 & 53 (providing for "party-agreed sentence" and
"abbreviated trial" respectively resolving cases without a trial), directive 46 (providing for
"proceeding by judicial decree" resolving cases without either a preliminary hearing or a
trial).
:!2 See also Jeffrey J. Miller, Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New Italian Criminal Procedure Code and in the United States: Towards a New U1!flerstanding of
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 215 (1990) (comparing
plea bargaining in Italy and the United States to support an argument that the cultural
aspects of different systems should be included in the traditional definitions of hierarchical and coordinate models to further understanding of different systems).
23 Although the practice of rewarding criminal defendants who turn state's evidence
in the United States and the protection of pentiti in Italy are important examples of official concessions in exchange for a defendant's cooperation and collaboration, this article
will not discuss these practices. Both the United States and Italy treat such instances
separately from the trial avoidance devices discussed in this article. Accordingly, a detailed examination and comp'arison of these practices is left to another day.
24 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Emily Rubin,
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed
Consent, 80 VA. L. REV. 1699 (1994).
2.S See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50 (1968); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983); Robert Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471 (1993).
26 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976).
Z7 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
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aI-avoidance mechanisms adopted in Italy only eight years ago
already have raised a number of constitutional concerns over the
powers, roles, and authorities of the players in the criminal justice system. More recently, in the United States, plea bargaining
has raised diametric concerns that the criminal justice system is
too soft on criminals by allowing those who admit guilt to serve a
lighter sentence than what they might otherwise deserve. 28
These concerns have resulted in efforts to limit the discretion of
the prosecutor to engage in plea bargaining. 29 In contrast, Italy
is currently examining ways to broaden the application of trialavoidance procedures. 3o Analysis of these trial-avoidance measures in the United States and in Italy reveals a number of pendulum swings in both countries with respect to attitudes concerning the purposes of a criminal justice system, and the beliefs
regarding the appropriate roles of the players involved. As each
country begins to move away from its traditional perspective on
criminal justice-Italy toward a greater use of alternatives to
trial and more dispersion of powers among criminal justice play-

L.J. 1179 (1975).
21!
See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 491-92
(5th ed. 1995) (discussing the criticisms of unduly lenient sentences and of inaccurate
conviction records where the prosecutor has engaged in "charge bargaining," both of
which "breed cynicism about the degree to which our legal system cares about truth");
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 957 (1989); Misner, supra note 25, at 752 (noting that plea bargaining "has now come
under attack from those that believe it has resulted in insufficient punishment for offenders").
.. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 1996) (prohibiting "plea bargaining
in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony"); State v.
Hessen, 678 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of an absolute ban on
plea bargaining in all drunk driving cases in municipal court); Teresa White Carns &
John A. Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310 (1992)
(discussing the 1975 ban on plea bargaining by Alaska's Attorney General); Robert A.
Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35
UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987) (regarding an attempted judicial ban on plea bargaining in
felony prosecutions); Roland Acevedo, Note, Is A Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical
Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987
(1995) (examining the Bronx County District Attorney's announcement that there would
be no bargaining with criminal defendants who had been indicted for felony offenses) .
•10
See Disegno di legge, July 14, 1994, n. 440, art. 13 (Italy) (legislation proposed in
1994, but not enacted, which sought to eliminate the need for prosecutorial consent to
resolve cases by one of the trial-avoidance procedures).
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ers, and the United States toward greater consolidation of powers in the prosecutor-each must grapple with how to resolve the
resulting tensions and conflicts among the respective roles of the
participants in the system.
This Article first describes how accusatory and nonaccusatory
systems define truth, and how the structures of their systems
reflect these different definitions of truth. Part II traces trialavoidance mechanisms in Italy, both under the 1989 Code, as
well as a limited first step adopted in 1981. This part discusses
the tensions these changes created between judges and prosecutors in Italy, and provides an in-depth examination of the
tortuous path by which the Italian Constitutional Court has
attempted to resolve these conflicts. Part III discusses the extent
to which Italy's trial-avoidance devices mirror the practice of
plea bargaining in the United States, the extent to which plea
bargaining is actually characteristic of an accusatorial system,
and similar types of tensions between judges and prosecutors
that exist in the United States. In addition, this part examines
how recent trends in the United States, such as so-called "Three
Strikes" laws and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, have affected plea bargaining in the United States, and how these de- .
velopments counsel that Italy proceed with caution when considering proposals to broaden their trial-avoidance mechanisms.
I.

THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

A comparison of the search for truth in accusatory and inquisitorial criminal justice systems initially requires a distinction between two types of "truths"-material truth and formal truth.
"Truth" in an inquisitorial jurisdiction assumes the existence of a
"material and absolute" truth, "external to and independent of
the trial.,,31 This goal of ascertaining "material or substantive
~I GIUSEPPE DI CHIARA, PROCESSO PENALE E GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALEITINERARI 3 (1996). See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparative Law: Its Purposes
and Possibilities, 27 TEX.lNT'L L.J. 315, 319-20 (1992) ("The goal of the continental investigation and trial remains to find the 'objective trutb .... ) (reviewing BERNHARD
GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAw (1990».
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truth" is in contrast to the "procedural or formal truth" pursued
in accusatory systems. Procedural truth is the result achieved by
following formal rules designed to ensure that the process is fair,
and that individual rights have been protected. Accusatory systems tend to eschew the feasibility of ascertaining the material
truth of a case and instead settle for the perhaps more realistic
goal of achieving "procedural or formal truth." The structural
differences between accusatory and inquisitorial systems reflect
this distinction in their philosophies regarding criminal justice
systems. 32
An accusatorial system places central importance on the trial
as the means by which the parties present and debate the evidence which they have each discovered. The factfinder, usually a
jury, has the responsibility of evaluating the evidence and reaching a verdict. Correspondingly, the ideal role of the trial judge is
non-active and impartial. Along with entrusting such a high
degree of control over the trial to the parties, accusatorial systems include complex rules governing procedural and evidentiary
aspects of the trial, such as placing a high burden on the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,33 and the intricate web of rules surrounding the exclusionary rule. 34 Participants and critics alike acknowledge that these technical rules
actually may impede the factfinder's ability to ascertain substantive truth in any given case. 35 However, this division of responsibility and the formal rules reflect the democratic characteristic
of establishing checks on the actions of the participants. One
explanation or justification for this system is that where the
parties are equally armed and have the opportunity to present

32
Gherardo Colombo, The New Code of Criminal Procedure, in 5 ITALIAN POLITICS: A
REVIEW 55, 58 (Filippo Sabetti & Raimondo Catanzaro eds., 1991).
•<1
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
". Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states by
incorporating it through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1994).
'" Damaska, supra note 11, at 506, 579-80; see also Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361,
378 (1976) (arguing that the rules in the United States encourage defendants to remain
silent, thus depriving the factfinder of evidence from the accused).
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evidence and arguments, the substantive truth will emerge as a
result of this dialectic.36 A more realistic explanation may be
that the complex rules governing trials reflect a recognition of
the near impossibility of determining the substantive truth.
Therefore, accusatorial systems place their faith in the adherence by the parties and judges to technical rules to protect the
fairness of the process and the guarantees of the constitution,
thus achieving justice, though perhaps not substantive truth. 37
The deference accorded by appellate courts to findings at the
trial level is consistent with the search for formal or procedural
truth in an accusatorial system. In part, such deference reflects
the notion that factual findings include aspects which an appellate court is not equipped to evaluate based on the "cold record.,,38 For example, the factfinders are in the best position to ,
evaluate the live presentation of evidence, particularly witnesses,
and consider demeanor and other characteristics not present in
the transcript of the trial. However, this appellate deference also
reflects the accusatory goal of ensuring formal or procedural
truth. As long as the reviewing court e~an find that the rules
were adhered to, it usually will not upset the trial verdict.39
The different definition of truth in inquisitorial systems likewise is reflected in the different structure of the criminal justice
system. Inquisitorial systems marginalize the importance of the
trial and the dialectical debate between the parties while
exhalting the role of the investigative judge in researching, analyzing, and evaluating the evidence to come to a logical decision
dictated by such evidence.4o Assigning such an active role to the
trial judge, and collapsing most of the responsibilities into this

:16
Luigi Carli, 'Fatto e Verita nell'Ideologia della Riforma e della Controriforma del
Codice di Procedura Penale: Le Ragioni dei Pratici, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E
PROCEDURA PENALE 230, 234 (A. Giuffre ed., 1995).
:r7 Damaska, supra note 11, at 580.
"0 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge I Jury Question and Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986).
:19
Id.
4. Damaska, supra note 11, at 582; see also DI CHIARA, supra note 31, at 4.
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single player, reflects the philosophy that a trained individual,
the judge, can perform the mental and logical gymnastics required to discover the substantive truth.41 Correspondingly, the
defense attorney and prosecutor have passive roles at both the
trial and the investigative stages, since they are considered extraneous to the judge's task of logical deduction. 42
The existence of very few evidentiary or procedural rules also
reflects the inquisitorial goal of determining substantive truth. 43
The investigative judge is required to investigate and consider
all evidence necessary and relevant to determining the truth,
and very few evidentiary barriers exist to impede the judge's
investigation. Moreover, the judge's determination of guilt or
innocence is not bound by a specific standard or burden of
pro of. 44
The structure and powers of appellate courts also reflect the
inquisitorial goal of determining the substantive or material
truth. Appellate courts are not limited to considering solely "legal" questions, but have the power to reevaluate the evidence
and even consider additional evidence that was not considered
by, or available to, the trial judge. Such superior review, "as a
matter of course,,,45 substantially sacrifices the independence
and autonomy of the trial judge, thus furthering the goal of ascertaining the substantive truth.
Despite the differences in definitions of truth, and the structures and methods used to determine truth, accusatory and nonaccusatory systems alike must confront the problems of overburdened criminal justice systems, and institute mechanisms for
handling these practical problems. Both the United States and

41
42

DI CHIARA, supra note 31, at 4.
[d. at 3; see also ERALDO STEFANI, LA DIFESA ATTIVA NEL GruorZIO ABBREVIATO E

NEL PATTEGGIAMENTO [The Active Defense Attorney in the Abbreviated Trial and in Plea
Bargaining] 7 (1994).
.. Damaska, supra note 11, at 564.
44
See Fassler, supra note 12, at 268; see also NPR All Things Considered, supra note
5.
45
MiIjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480, 525 (1974).
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Italy recognize the impossibility of trying every criminal case
according to the complex and time-consuming procedures which,
by providing greater assurance that the criminal justice system
will protect individual rights, appear to define a liberal democratic society. Thus, each country has developed mechanisms for
screening out, or otherwise disposing of, cases without employing
the centerpiece of the system. In the United States, nearly 90%
of all criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargains,46 whereby
the defendant admits guilt in exchange for some concession by
the prosecutor such as dropping some of the counts against the
defendant, reducing the charge to a less severe crime, or making
a sentencing recommendation to the judge based on the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility. The practice of plea
bargaining runs counter to the accusatorial method of determining truth because, to a large degree, the responsibilities of investigating, charging, and sentencing are collapsed into one player,
the prosecutor, reducing the checks on his or her exercise of
authority. In addition, plea bargaining sacrifices rights fundamental to assuring the fairness of the accusatorial process. The
devices adopted in Italy's 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure,
which this article will discuss in detail, are much more limited
and grant prosecutors less discretion than that conceded to prosecutors in the United States.
In developing mechanisms for making their criminal justice
systems more efficient, both the United States and Italy have
had to grapple with the conflicts and tensions between the
search for truth or justice and the goal of efficiency.

•• u.s. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAM, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 530 (1993) (stating that m 1993,

88.5% of federal conVIctions were a result of guilty pleas); see also Abraham S. Goldstem,
Reflections on Two Models: Inqu~sitonal Themes m Amencan Cnmmal Procedure, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1974) (explammg that "more than 90% of cnmmal cases are
never tned; they are concluded by pleas of guilty .."). These statistics do not distinguish between cases resolved solely due to defendant's admiSSion of guilt and those resolved by such an admiSSion m exchange for some sort of governmental concessIOn.
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PAITEGGIAMENTO IN ITALy"7

Prior to the statutory reforms in 1981 and 1989, the method of
dealing with judicial backlog of criminal cases was for Parliament occasionally to grant amnesty to entire groups of defendants. 48 The 1981 law was a first and tentative step toward a
formal, statutorily governed trial-avoidance device in Italy. It
added the word patteggiamento to the vocabulary of Italian criminal attorneys, judges, and legal scholars. 49
A. A Tentative First Step in 1981

Article 77 of the 1981 law provided50 that, upon request of the
defendant and consent of the prosecutor, the judge could decide
that elements exist for applying a sanzione sostitutiva (substituted sanction)-a form of punishment other than imprisonment-such as controlled liberty51 or a monetary fine. 52 Such
alternative sentences, however, were not available for all types of
crimes. 53 This modification was designed to unclog the criminal
courts, which were heavily burdened with petty or less serious

.7 Patteggiamento is the Italian word for plea bargain. 2 FRANCESCO DE FRANCHIS,
DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO-ITALIANO-INGLESE [LAW DICTIONARy-ITALIAN-ENGLISH) 1058
(1996).
•• William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1992).
•• Modifiche al sistema penale, Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689.
50 Articles 77-80 were expressly abrogated by article 234 of the legislative decree
number 271 of July 28, 1989. This legislative decree includes rules for the enactment of
the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which include rules regarding the coordination of
the new code with other laws and the transition from the old code to the new one. Legislative Decree, July 28, 1989, No. 271, art. 234.
•• Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 56. Controlled liberty might be best analogized
to the use of probation in the United States. The convicted person may not leave his or
her comune (community or town) of residence without authorization, and must present
himself or herself at least once a day to the local public safety official.
52
Id.
5:, Id. art. 60. Article 60 lists, for example, crimes for which substituted sanctions are
not permitted, including several forms of bribery, perjury, sale of harmful or spoiled food
products, and usury. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] arts. 318-322, 371-373, 444, 644, respectively.
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offenses.54 The defendant had until the opening of trial to request an alternative sanction, allowing the judge to dispose of
such cases without a trial. In exchange for requesting a sanzione
sostitutiva defendants received certain benefits. The defendant
received a sentence less severe than incarceration. Moreover, the
1981 law provided that the court could even expunge the crime
itself.55
Where the judge granted the defendant's request for sanzione
sostitutiva, the defendant waived both a trial and the ability to
appeal other than to the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation).56 This very limited form of rewarding a defendant who
agreed to waive his constitutional right to be tried57 in exchange
for a less severe punishment was dubbed patteggiamento. 58 Use
of the term patteggiamento in describing these provisions of the
1981 law indicates the drafters specifically had in mind the U.S.
device of plea bargaining.59 However, unlike plea bargaining in
the United States, the 1981 law involved neither a "plea" nor a
"bargain." The 1981 law did not require the defendant to admit
guilt or responsibility, nor could there be even an implicit admission of guilt where the defendant requested the alternative sanctions set out in article 77.60 Otherwise, the defendant's position
under the ensuing ordinary procedures might be prejudiced. 61
Specifically, under the pre-1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, the
judge was required to enter a judgment of acquittal at any stage
of the proceedings where the judge believed that the defendant
did not commit the crime or that the defendant was otherwise
.. See ROSANNA GAMBINI Musso, IL "PLEA BARGAINING" FRA COMMON LAw E CIVIL
LAw 114 (1985).
... Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n. 689, art. 77. However, if the defendant had already
benefitted from this law or had prior sentences for which imprisonment was imposed, the
defendant was ineligible to request sanzione sostitutiua. [d., art. 80.
60 [d. art. 77(3) •
• 7 COST. art. 25, § 1r.. See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gazz. Uff.] Oct. 24, 1988, n. 250,
supp. ord. 106-7 (Report of the Preliminary Project) (referring to articles 77-85 of the
1981 law as "so-called patteggiamento").
S9 Musso, supra note 54, at 115-16.
M
See id. at 120, 135.
[d. at 120.
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not punishable. 62 Were the defendant's request for a substituted
sanction to constitute a confession or an admission of guilt, the
defendant would be deprived of the possibility of a subsequent
judicial order of acquittal in cases where the judge had previously denied the request for a substituted sanction.
In addition, the provisions of the 1981 law involved very little
actual "bargaining," and no' bargaining between the parties.
Rather, the law set out the circumstances in which a criminal
defendant might be rewarded for waiving the right to be presumed innocent,63 to present a defense,64 and to be tried by a
judge. 65 While the 1981 law required the prosecutor's consent,
there was no requirement that the defendant and the prosecutor
come to an agreement as to the alternative sanction. Rather, use
of the procedure depended entirely upon the initiative of the
defendant.
Other than that stemming from the prospect of ultimately
being convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, there was little
pressure on the defendant to request the statutorily provided
alternative sanctions. Under the terms of the statute, the prosecutor was involved only to grant or withhold consent to the
defendant's request. In addition, given the narrow confines of
prosecutorial discretion in charging, a prosecutor could do little
to encourage the defendant to invoke the statute. Despite the
slight resemblance to plea bargaining in the United States, the
1981 law is important because it required the Italian judiciary,
primarily the Constitutional Court, to begin to grapple with
profound issues in reconciling the traditional philosophy of discovering truth with the goal of promoting judicial efficiency.

"t
6.1

CODICE Rocco art. 152, para. 2 (currently C.P.P. art. 129).
COST. art. 27, § 2 (stating that a defendant is not considered guilty until a judg-

ment of conviction is final).
•• COST. art. 24, § 2 (stating that the right of defense is inviolable at every phase and
stage of the proceedings) .
.., COST. art. 25, § 1 (stating that no one may be denied the right to be tried by a
natural and lawfully appointed judge).
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In a 1984 judgment, the Italian Constitutional Court considered challenges to the 1981 law which primarily questioned the
effect of the law on the roles of the judge and prosecutor. 66 One
such argument focused on the fact that article 77 of the 1981 law
provided that the judge might impose alternative sanctions at
the request of the defendant and with the consent of the prosecutor. Where the prosecutor refused to agree to the defendant's request, the prosecutor effectively had veto power over the judge's
ability to grant the defendant's request, thus exorbitantly elevating the role of the prosecutor. This, argued the lower COurtS,67
implicated three provisions of the Italian Constitution. First, article three requires equal treatment of, or parity between, the
public prosecutor and the defendant. 68 The law's provision that
the prosecutor's lack of consent required the judge to deny the
request resulted in an unjustifiable disparity of treatment between the prosecutor and the defendant. Second, article 101 of
the constitution provides that "[j]udges are subject only to the
laws.,,69 The binding nature of the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the defendant's request for substituted sanctions made
the judge subject to the prosecutor's decision, rather than to the
law. This discretionary decision by the prosecutor intruded on
the trial judge's autonomy. In addition, the veto power which the
prosecutor had under the law arguably violated article 102 of the
constitution which states that "[t]he judicial function will be
exercised by regular judges . . . ,,70 because the lack of consent
by the prosecutor amounts to a judicial decision. This aspect of
the 1981 law required a closer look at the roles of the prosecutor

66

Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.], Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro Italiano [Foro

It.] I 1171.
67 In Italy, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court includes review of laws for legality. COST. art. 134, § 2. However, only lower court judges may raise constitutional
questions before the Constitutional Court. While parties might suggest constitutional
questions, they may not invoke the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on their own.
See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 77-79 (1967).
... "All citizens have equal social standing and are equal before the law, without
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or social and personal conditions." CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 67, at 281 (quoting COST. art 3, § 1).
6.. COST. art. 101, § 2.
70 COST. art. 102, § 1.
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and the judge, a task further complicated by the fact that both
prosecutors and judges are considered magistrati (magistrates),
and thus have the same education and career paths, as well as
overlapping functions.71
Italy's Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court) rejected each
of the arguments set out above.72 In upholding the challenged
provisions of the 1981 law, the Constitutional Court examined
the role of the prosecutor and the effect of the prosecutor's decision not to concur in the defendant's request. The court concluded that the prosecutor's decision in response to the defendant's
request is not equivalent to a sentence disposing of the case. 73
That is, the prosecutor does not usurp the judicial function of
deciding the case by withholding consent. Rather, the action of
the prosecutor represents a mere choice as to the procedural
mechanism used to dispose of the case. Where the prosecutor
consents, the prosecutor has opted to dispose of the case without
a trial and subject the defendant to one of the alternative sanctions rather than imprisonment. If the prosecutor withholds consent, the case proceeds under ordinary procedures in which the
defendant will have the opportunity to present arguments in his
or her favor, and the judge will then reach a decision on the
charges and the punishment, which could, despite the
prosecutor's dissent, consist of an alternative sanction. 74 Thus,
71
The term magistrati includes both judges and prosecutors. DIZIONARIO
GIURIDICO-ITALlANo-INGLESE, supra note 47, at 953-954. See also COST. arts. 104-107
(regarding the formation of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura (Superior Council
of Magistrates), which is responsible for the discipline of both judges and prosecutors);
Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 83-84 (1994).
7l
Corte cost., Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro. It. 11171.
73
Id.
7. The specific statutory interpretation employed by the Constitutional Court centered on article 79 of the 1981 law which stated that the judge could proceed according to
the elements under article 77 at any point in the trial where the defendant has requested
an alternative sanction as outlined in article 77. Article 77 speaks of a defendant's request before the opening of the trial and requires the consent of the prosecutor. In determining that this requirement ofprosecutorial consent did not violate the constitution, the
court looked to article 79, and concluded that the intial lack of consent by the prosecutor
ultimately would not preclude the judge from imposing an alternative sentence where the
defendant had made the request before trial. Furthermore, the lack of prosecutorial consent did not constitute a prosecutorial "veto" depriving the defendant of the benefits of
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the prosecutor's decision to withhold consent would not deprive
the defendant of the opportunity to obtain an alternative sentence upon conclusion of the ordinary proceedings. The
prosecutor's lack of consent only precludes use of the procedure
set out under the 1981 law of disposing of certain cases without
a trial. The Constitutional Court also indicated an unwillingness
to force a prosecutor to proceed with a case in a certain way by
speaking of the prosecutor's prerogative as to the procedure used
to dispose of the case.75 Certainly, this hesitation to force a procedure on a prosecutor contributed to the law's relative ineffectiveness in achieving its goal of unclogging the criminal justice
system. When a judge disagrees with the prosecutor, the judge
might impose the ·alternative sentence after the ordinary procedure had been followed, but neither the statute nor the Constitutional Court's decision permitted a judge to disregard the
prosecutor's wishes and simply dispose of the case without the
ordinary procedure. Nor did the law provide for trial court or
appellate review of the prosecutor's refusal to consent. A convincing explanation for this reluctance to force a procedure on the
prosecutor is that both prosecutors and judges are part of the
judicial organ in Italy.76 There is no hierarchy of judges and
public prosecutors. 77 Therefore, if the prosecutor has decided
that a criminal case should proceed under the ordinary procedures, this decision is to be respected as one made by an impartial and autonomous member of the judiciary.78 This is especially true since before the 1989 Code the functions of the prose-

the 1981 law, because an alternative sentence might ultimately be imposed. Id.
75 See Musso, supra note 54, at 136.
76 No single constitutional article expressly states that judges and prosecutors are
part of the judiciary. Nonetheless, Chapter IV of the constitution, entitled "The Judiciary," includes provisions regarding public prosecutors. COST. Ch. IV. For example, article
107 outlines the disciplinary function of the Superior Council of Magistrature, and discusses both judges and prosecutors. COST. art. 107. The chapter covering the judiciary
also includes article 112 which states that "[t]he duty of prosecution in criminal proceedings pertains to the Public Prosecutor." COST. art. 112.
77 "Magistrates shall be differentiated only by the diversity of their functions." COST.
art. 107, §4. See also Musso, supra note 54, at 143.
7. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 67, at 107; see also Musso, supra note 54, at
144.
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cutor and judge were not as clearly separated and distinguished
as they now are under the new Code.
The Constitutional Court also rejected the argument of inequality between the parties as a result of the prosecutor's refusal to consent. Relying on its conclusion that the action of the
prosecutor did not amount to a judicial function, the court further concluded that at trial the judge would objectively evaluate
the prosecutor's reasons for withholding consent, just as the
judge would evaluate the defendant's reasons for making the
request. This analysis thus preserved parity between the parties. 79 As to the roles of the prosecutor and judge, the opinion
seems to tread carefully in an effort to maintain the autonomous
spheres of each while at the same time avoiding a hierarchical
ordering of the two roles; neither can act to bind the other. That
is, the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the defendant's request
cannot prohibit the judge from imposing alternative sanctions after the ordinary procedures, and the judge's disagreement with
the prosecutor cannot force the prosecutor into a procedure
which prematurely terminates the case. The court's delineation
of the functions of judges and prosecutors, while convincing,
unduly insulates the prosecutor's refusal to agree to the alternative method of disposing of cases at the cost of limiting the efficacy of the 1981 law.
Aside from the tensions between the prosecutor and judge, the
1981 law raised other, more practical concerns. Significant is the
issue of exactly what the law accomplished in terms of streamlining the criminal justice system and unclogging the courts. On
the face of the law, it appears that the ordinary procedure of
disposing of cases is not necessary where the prosecutor agrees
to the defendant's request for a substituted sanction and the
judge grants the application. To evaluate the quantity of judicial
resources saved under this early form of trial avoidance, one
must examine what constituted the ordinary procedure. As discussed earlier, the Rocco Code of 1930 provided for a public triaL

'" Corte cost., Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro. It. I 1171.
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Nonetheless, given the concentration of investigative and dispositive powers in the figure of the giudice istruttore, investigative judge, the trial became a mere formality during which, at
most, the defendant made a statement and the court heard arguments by the defense attorney and prosecutor. The judge relied
almost exclusively on the evidence collected during the investigative stages.so Therefore, the 1981 law's mechanism to avoid the
ordinary procedure or trial did not save a significant amount of
judicial resources since the trial was a mere formality to confirm
the results of the prior investigation. The 1981 law does not
provide for the application of the alternative sanctions automatically upon the defendant's request and the prosecutor's consent.
Rather, the judge must determine the appropriateness of such
sanctions. Article 77 states that where the judge believes, based
on an examination of the record that elements exist for applying
one of the substituted sanctions, the judge may order such a
sentence upon the request of the defendant and the consent of
the prosecutor.S l The vagueness of this language raises additional questions concerning the conflict between the goal of uncovering the truth and the goal of achieving efficiency through
trial-avoidance measures. This language does not clearly state
what role the judge has when the defendant and the prosecutor
agree to the imposition of an alternative sanction. On the one
hand, the judge might be in the position of merely ratifying the
request of the parties, a rubber-stamping role, as long as the
type of crime involved is not one listed in article 60 as one to
which no substituted sanction applies. On the other hand, the
law might require the judge to assess and evaluate the facts involved. The first interpretation amounts to a substantial abdication of the judge's role of dominating the procedure. However,
such an abdication of judicial power in this narrow setting may
be what is necessary to achieve greater efficiency in the processing of criminal cases. If, instead, the correct interpretation of
this vague language is that the judge must conduct some degree

"" See PiZZI & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 4.
HI Le LeggI, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 77.
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of assessment of the joint request, the next question is what
level of assessment or evaluation is necessary?
The 1981 law does not expressly require that the judge make a
determination of the defendant's responsibility or guilt. Arguably, however, the Italian Constitution requires a determination
of guilt before imposing punishment. 82 The response to this argument is that the constitutional provision requires a determination of guilt only before imposing the punishment of imprisonment. Application of the alternative sanctions does not require
such a judgment because imprisonment is never imposed. Implicitly, this appears to be how the Italian legislature resolved this
potential constitutional problem.
Under another article of the 1981 law, after a defendant is
convicted, the judge may decide that an alternative, non-incarceration sentence is appropriate. 83 The judge may also impose a
punishment called "semi-detention."84 This form of punishment
is permitted only where the defendant has been found guilty of
criminal activity, and the punishment is not listed as an alternative punishment where the defendant requests a substituted
sanction before the opening of the trial. It thus appears that the
legislature recognized the potential problem of depriving a person ofliberty, even if only ten hours a day, where there has been
no finding of guilt.
Nonetheless, some standard must apply to the judge's decision
whether to accept the request of the parties, even if the constitution does not require a finding of guilt for imposition of one of
the substituted sanctions. The penultimate paragraph of article
77 states that the provisions of the first section of the 1981 law

"2 COST. art. 13 ("There shall be no form of detention ... nor any other restriction
whatsoever of personal liberty except by a decision, wherein the reasons are stated .. .n).
.... Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 53.
... Id. A sentence of semi-detention requires the defendant to spend at least ten hours
each day confined in a type of institute as defined by another law. In addition, semi-detention includes other provisions that prohibit the convict from possessing weapons, suspend his driver's license, and confiscate his passport. Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art.
55. The closest U.S. analogue to Italy's semi-detention would probably be the work-release programs in some states.
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are to be followed in the determination and application of a substituted sanction.85 The first section referred to in article 77
includes articles 53-76 and concerns the application of substituted sanctions where a defendant has been convicted, thus assuming a finding of guilt. Reference to articles 53-76 may provide a
judge operating under article 77 with some guidelines as to
whether an alternative sanction is appropriate. 86 However, it
will not help a judge determine the extent to which a finding of
guilt is necessary. Therefore, the incorporation of these earlier
articles still leaves a gap between the defendant's request, along
with the prosecutor's consent, and the judge's final decision to
grant the defendant's request. One commentator has surmised
that the problems ansing out of the 1981 law are due to a lack of
clarity in distinguishing between decriminalizing certain offenses
and creating alternative procedures for disposing of some offenses. 87 Eliminating the punishment of imprisonment is a form
of decriminalization, and the arguably nonpenal sanctions which
the judge may impose do not require a determination of the
defendant's guilt. If instead, article 77 merely creates a different
procedure as to some crimes, while still remaining within the
criminal realm, then the procedure must end with a judgment as
to the crimes charged, thus requiring the judge to evaluate the
evidence.
Although this is a significant, albeit tentative, step toward
disposing of some cases without trial, very few defendants requested to proceed under the provisions of article 77. One explanation for this may be that defendants preferred to proceed under the ordinary mechanisms and hope that if convicted their
sentence would be suspended.88 A suspended sentence was not
listed as a substitute sanction available under the 1981 law.
Rather, a suspended sentence was available only upon conviction, and since a disposition of the crime under the 1981 law did

Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 77(2).
... See Musso, supra note 54, at 127.

M

[d. at 134.
Sergio Sottani, Osservazioni Critiche sui Nuovo Patteggiamento, in QUESTJONI
NUOVE DI PROCEDURA PENALE: I GIUDIZI SEMPLIFICATI 119, 123 (A. Gaito ed., 1989).
'7
M
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not involve a conviction, the judge was unable to grant a suspended sentence. Thus, by its own terms, the 1981 law limited
the extent to which cases might be disposed of without trial, and
by its ambiguities further limited the possibility of effectively
unclogging the Italian criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the
1981 law and the Constitutional Court's analysis of it provided a
starting point for the drafters of the 1989 Code.
B. Broader Mechanisms Under the 1989 Code

Unlike the tinkering and ambiguity exemplified in the 1981
law, the 1989 revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure represents an overhaul of the system and contains a clearer statement
of the goals. The legislation delegatint9 to the Italian Government the task of drafting a new code of criminal procedure proclaims that the new code must put into effect the characteristics
of an accusatory system, in addition to carrying out the principles of the Italian Constitution and conforming to international
conventions ratified by Italy.90 This delegating legislation lists
105 principles and criteria which the government was to use in
carrying out these directives. Among these principles is a limited
form of plea bargaining, set out in directive number forty-five of
the delegating legislation. 91 Directive number fifty-three sketches a second mechanism to dispose of criminal proceedings without a trial. 92 Pursuant to the delegating legislation, Book VI of
Hq
Under the Italian Constitution, the Government (the Prime Minister and his cabinet) "may not issue any decree having the force of an ordinary law without a mandate
from [Parliament]." COST. art. 77, para. 1. Thus, the two chambers of parliament, the
Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and the Senato (Senate), issue detailed legislation delegating to the Government the task of drafting the specific provisions of the
proposed law. COST. art. 76.
!lO
81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2.
,., [P]rovision that the prosecutor with the consent of the defendant, or the defendant
with the consent of the prosecutor, may request up until the opening of the trial, that the
judge apply a substituted sanction where permissible, or a sentence of imprisonment,
where such a sentence would not exceed two years, after considering all of the circumstances and applying the one-third reduction [awarded to the defendant for having
waived his right to trial].
81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directive 45.
"2
[The] power of the judge to pronounce a sentence on the merits during the prelim i-
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the new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure sets out five
procedimenti speciali (special procedures), two of which permit a
sentence of imprisonment without a trial as outlined by directives forty-five and fifty-three, respectively-applicazione della
pena su richiesta delle parti (application of punishment upon the
request of the parties, or agreed punishment) and giudizio
abbreviato (abbreviated or summary trial).93
The new code does not use language of bargaining to describe
the devices of agreed punishment and summary trial. However,
the report of the preliminary project on the new code distinguishes the two mechanisms in terms of the subject of the parties'
bargaining.94 In the preparatory works on the new code members of the Camera dei Deputati referred to la pena su richiesta
as bargaining of punishment, and to giudizio abbreviato as bargaining of procedure, using the Italian word for bargain,
patteggiamento. 95 These labels emphasize the fact that la pena
su richiesta involves an agreement between the parties as to the
punishment they would request the judge to impose. Giudizio
abbreviato, on the other hand, involves the agreement of the
parties to dispose of the case by a procedure different from a full
trial. Both mechanisms reward the defendant with a reduction in
the sentence finally imposed. Nonetheless, despite the fact that

nary hearing, if the defendant has so requested, the prosecutor has consented to the
resolution of the proceeding in this way, and the judge believes that he may decide the
case on the basis of the stato degli atti (the status of the evidence,literally). The resulting
sentence is to be reduced by one-third.
81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directive 53.
"" Giudizio abbreviato is governed by articles 438-443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions on applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti are articles
444-448. Another procedure which avoids the necessity of a trial is procedimento per
decreto (a proceeding by penal decree). C.P.P. arts. 459-464. This device permits prosecutors to request the imposition of a monetary fine reduced by one-half. Where the judge
grants the request, the case is disposed of without either a preliminary hearing or a trial.
Within fifteen days of the notification of the decree, the defendant may oppose the decree
by requesting one of the two other trial avoidance procedures, or a procedure called
giudizio immediato (immediate trial), pursuant to which the case proceeds immediately to
trial without a preliminary hearing. C.P.P. arts. 453-458.
.. Relazione al progetto preliminare, Gazz. Uff., Oct. 24, 1988, n.250, supp. ord. n.2,
104.
95

[d.
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the legislature, judges, and attorneys use the Italian term for
plea bargaining, the mechanisms under the new code, similar to
the 1981 law, do not require a defendant to admit guilt and
provide little opportunity for bargaining.
The main purpose of each of these provisions is to streamline
criminal justice and unclog the courts by providing methods by
which some cases might be resolved without the necessity of a
triaL However, each of these devices also raises conflicts with
the traditional search for substantive truth, as manifested by the
tensions created among the roles of the participants involved.
1. Party-Agreed Sentence 96

Application of punishment upon request of the parties is the
literal translation of the title of this section of the 1989 Code of
Criminal Procedure. However, Italian scholars, attorneys, prosecutors, and judges use the short-hand term patteggiamento (plea
bargain). In considering how to carry out directive forty-five of
the delegating legislation, the government looked to the device
set out in the 1981 law and sought to clarify vague aspects as
well as to broaden the scope of this form of plea bargaining. 97
Where the 1981 law limited the application of punishment
without trial only to a form of probation or the payment of a
monetary fine,98 the 198 Code provides that either the defendant or the prosecutor may request the imposition of a substituted sanction, if otherwise permissible, or a sentence of imprisonment, reduced by one-third, or a combination of substituted
sanctions and imprisonment. 99
Moreover, article 445 of the 1989 Code provides that the sentence imposed upon request of the parties is equivalent to a
conviction,lOO thus allowing the judge to suspend the sentence.

<J6

c.P.P. arts. 444-44B .

•, Report of the Preliminary Project, supra note 57, at 106-0B.
"" C.P.P. art. 444 .
•" [d.
1U0

C.P.P. art. 445.
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In fact, the defendant might condition the request to the judge
upon the granting of a suspended sentence, such that where the
judge denies the condition of suspension, the judge must deny
the entire request of the parties.
While the 1981 law listed the types of crimes for which a substituted sentence could not be imposed, the 1989 Code limits the
application of the section based on the length of the sentence
finally imposed. The code provides that the defendant and the
prosecutor may request the application of a sentence of imprisonment where, considering all of the circumstances and the onethird reduction provided by article 444, the final punishment
would not exceed two years. 10l By so limiting the use of the device, the new code adds flexibility to this trial-avoidance measure. The 1989 code also gives the defendant and the prosecutor
the ability to play with the sentence where the crime involved
specifies a minimum and maximum sentence, rather than a fixed
sentence. 102 In addition, it permits the parties to agree on the
existence of extenuating circumstances under the penal code,103
resulting in a further reduction of the ultimate sentence, even
before the statutorily prescribed one-third reduction is applied
under article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. l04
For example, take the crime of receipt of stolen goods, set out
in article 648 of the Penal Code. lo5 The first paragraph of article 648 imposes a sentence of imprisonment from two to eight
years, and a monetary fine of one to twenty million lire. 106
However, the next paragraph provides that for cases involving

C.P.P. art. 444.
For example, the crime of producing or trafficking illicit drugs is punishable by
eight to twenty years imprisonment. Le Leggi, Dec. 22, 1975, n.685, art. 71(1).
10:1 C.P. arts. 62-70.
104 One commentator has argued that the one-third reduction granted under giudizio
abbreuiato effectively permits a modification of articles 63 et seq. of the Penal Code.
Ernesto Lupo, Il Giudizio Abbreuiato e L'applicazione della Pena Negoziata, in QUESTIONI
NUOVE DI PROCEDURA PENALE: I GIUDIZI SEMPLIFICATI 61, 70 (A. Gaito ed., 1989). The
same critique applies to applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti.
10.' C.P. art. 648.
106 Assuming an exchange rate of 1500 lire to the dollar, this is about $666.00 to
$13,333.00.
101

102
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less serious facts, the punishment shall only be imprisonment up
to six years, and a fine of up to one million lire. 107 This paragraph does not indicate what factors make a case of stolen goods
less serious, nor does the provision state a minimum sentence.
Thus, upon agreeing that the particular case is less serious, the
prosecutor and the defense attorney could begin with a base sentence of one year. The parties could then agree that the defendant is entitled to a reduction of one-third, based on "generic" extenuating circumstances under the penal code. lOB Finally, given
the decision of the defendant to opt for this procedure, the sentence would be reduced by another one-third. 109 In this example, the defendant could end up with a final sentence of six
months.1l0 Thus, depending on the type of sentence statutorily
assigned to a particular crime, the applicazione della pena su
richiesta delle parti provides the parties with a great deal of
flexibility in reaching a final sentence of less than two years
which they will request of the judge.
This example also illustrates another difference between the
1981 law and article 444 of the 1989 code. Under the 1981 law,
initiation of the procedure depended upon the defendant's request, which did not include any discussion with the prosecutor.
In contrast, the applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti
involves a joint request based on an agreement of the parties as
to the nature of the crime as well as the length and type of punishment. When the parties put the request to the judge, they
have already agreed upon how to characterize the crime in-

1111

If~
109

c.P. art. 648(2).
C.P. art. 65(3).
C.P.P. art. 444.

110
This example is based on a case which the author observed in the Pretura of Rome
on September 18, 1996. In this case the amount involved was eighteen million lire. Typically, amounts over ten million lire are not considered to be less serious cases entitled to
the sentence set out in paragraph two of article 648 of the Penal Code (according to a
conversation with defense attorney Maurizio Bellacosa, Sept. 18, 1996). However, in this
case, the prosecutor agreed to treat the case under the second paragraph, thus avoiding
the minimum two-year sentence, but told the defense attorney that the final agreed-upon
sentence would have to be six months. The two then worked to reach the result indicated
in the text accompanying this footnote. The judge approved the sentence requested by the
parties.
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volved-as in the above example where the parties agreed that
the case of receipt of stolen property was of a less severe nature-in addition to having agreed upon the final sentence. Commentators have noted that this marked increase in the parties'
control over criminal proceedings is consistent with the delegating legislation's directive of adopting accusatorial characteristics
in the new Code of Criminal Procedure.1l1 However, it is precisely this increase in the powers of the defendant and the prosecutor that has conflicted with several constitutional norms defining the roles of the participants in the criminal justice system.
In contrast to the 1981 law, article 444 of the new code includes some express standards by which the judge is to evaluate
the request of the parties. However, the absence of certain standards has led to constitutional challenges. Article 444 states that
the judge is to determine whether the parties have proposed the
correct legal qualification or definition of the crime and whether
they have accurately applied and balanced the circumstances involved to reach an appropriate punishment. 1l2 Thus, in the
above example of receipt of stolen goods, the judge must initially
evaluate whether the parties correctly qualified the crime as less
serious under paragraph two of article 648 of the penal code,
thus avoiding the mandatory minimum sentence. Further, the
judge must assess whether the parties correctly applied the reduction for generic extenuating circumstances, under article
65(3) of the penal code. However, articles 444-448 are silent as to
the judge's power to evaluate a sentence in an individual case for
proportionality, a discretionary
power expressly given to the
,

III See, e.g., MARIO CHIAVARIO, PROCEDURA PENALE: UN CODICE TRA "STORIA" E
CRONACA 119-20 (1996); Lupo, supra note 104, at 81; GIOVANNI PAOLOZZI, IL GIUDIZIO
ABBREVIATO 17 (1991); STEFANI, supra note 42, at 5-6. But see ANIELLO NAPPI, GUIDA AL
Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 343-44 (3rd ed. 1992) (characterizing bothgiudizio

abbreviato and la pena su richiesta delle parti as examples of the inquisitorial method);
Giuliano VassaIli, La Giustizia Penale Statunitense e la Riforma del Processo Penale
Italiano, in PROCESSO PENALE NEGLI STATI UNITI 251, 259 (E. Amodio et aI. eds., 1988)
(arguing that plea bargaining in Italy is needed as a practical matter to relieve the otherwise impossible burden on the justice system, not because it is a grand procedural principle representative of an accusatorial system).
112 C.P.P. art. 444(2).

446

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

judge under articles 132 and 133 of the penal code.1!3 The argument is that since this is a power allocated to the judge, the
procedure set out in article 444, which allocates the selection of
the sentence to the agreement of the parties, violates the constitutional provision which states that "[j]udges are subject only to
the law."u4
In one of two orders considered jointly by the Constitutional
Court in 1990,115 the defendant had been charged with the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. 116 The prosecutor and
the defendant presented the judge with an agreed-upon sentence
of one year and six months imprisonment and a fine of two million lire, with the sentence to be suspended. The tribunale ll7
argued lIB the unconstitutionality of article 444 to the extent
that the judge could not consider the adequacy of the sentence
when compared to the gravity of the offense, even though the
parties had correctly defined the offense and correctly found the
existence of extenuating circumstances. The Constitutional Court
rejected this argument, holding that the constitution says nothing about proportionate sentences. However, the court did find
that the tribunale implicitly raised a constitutional question to
the extent that article 444 does not expressly permit the judge to
consider whether the agreed sentence promoted the constitutional goal of rehabilitation of the defendant. 119 In this regard, the
court found a constitutional violation, thus essentially amending
the statute to permit such an evaluation by the judge. 120

"" C.P. art. 133. This provision requires the judge to consider the gravity of the crime,
as well as the criminal nature of the individual defendant.
114
COST. art. 101.
llfi
Corte cost., July 2, 1990, n.313, 1990 Foro It. I 2385.
116
Le Leggi, Dec. 22, 1975, n.685, art. 71.
117
This is a trial court whose criminal jurisdiction covers crimes punishable by up to
eight years imprisonment. Campanella, supra note 71, at 68 n.91.
11M
See supra note 66.
119
The Italian Constitution states that "[p]unishments cannot involve inhumane
treatment and shall promote the rehabilitation of the convicted person." COST. art. 27,
para. 3.
'2" This author's description of the unconstitutionality found by the Constitutional
Court differs from that of other commentators who mistakenly characterized the finding
as a violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Pizzi & Marafioti,
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The tribunale also raised the argument that article 444 violated two other articles of the constitution which set out the judge's
role and authority.121 The court rejected these arguments, however, that article 444 relegates the judge's role and power to that
of a mere notary.122 Although article 102(1) provides that "[t]he
judicial function will be exercised by regular judges," the
tribunale argued that article 444 attributes to the judge a role of
merely reviewing the parties' agreement for legal legitimacy. The
court explained that the judge's evaluation of the agreement
between the parties is not simply an exercise in legal logic where
the judge assesses whether the agreement is covered by the law.
Rather, article 444 requires the judge to examine and evaluate
the evidence when drawing his conclusion on the appropriateness of the charge and the punishment. The judge is not bound
by the agreement of the parties, and a judge who disagrees with
the parties' determination will simply reject the agreement.
Additionally, article 444 states that the judge may grant the
parties' request unless an order of acquittal must be issued under article 129,123 thus requiring the judge to evaluate the merits of the case.
The argument based on article 102(1) of the Italian Constitution is closely related to the trial court's challenge based on article 111. Article 111 provides, in part, that "[i]n all dispositive
judicial actions the reasons must be stated. ,,124 The tribunale

supra note 48, at 34. The provision regarding the presumption of innocence is found in

article 27 of the Italian Constitution, as is the provision declaring the goal of rehabilitation. However, the Constitutional Court expressly rejected the argument that article 444
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence. Firstly, upon receipt of the request
of the parties, the judge must determine whether an aquittal is required under article
129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, where a defendant requests the application of an agreed-upon sentence, he waives his right to dispute the charges. This does not
violate the presumption of innocence which continues to exist until the sentence becomes
final. Corte cost., July 2, 1990, n.313, 1990 Foro It. I 2385.
121
COST. arts. 102(1) and 111(1).
122 Id. In Italy, the notaio is a category of practicing lawyers, unlike the American
notary public. Campanella, supra note 71, at 71-72.
12-1 C.P.P. art. 129.
124 COST. art. 111(1). In addition, the constitution states that "[t]here shall be no form
of detention, ... except by a [written] decision, wherein the reasons are stated, of the
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argued that article 444 permits a judge who approves the
parties' agreement to state that the sentence is imposed based on
the accord of the parties and a comparison of the circumstances,
and thus to simply ratify the parties' will. 125 That is, this section of the criminal procedure code does not require the judge to
explain his reason for finding that the sentence is legally justified, apart from the agreement of the parties; therefore, article
444 violates the constitutional requirement of a written justification. The Constitutional Court held that in the opinion disposing
of the case based on the agreement of the parties, a judge must
include an assessment of the correctness of the juridical definition of the case, as well as a comparison of the aggravating and
extenuating circumstances involved. Thus, the Constitutional
Court confirmed the requirement that the judge issue written
reasons for the sentence even when the trial court imposes the
sentence agreed upon by the parties. 126 However, the court's
holding is difficult to reconcile with the principle of "libero
convincimento del giudice", or, the independent and autonomous
decision of the judge, which has signified the authority of the
judge to determine both the responsibility and the sentence of a
criminal defendant, almost from scratch. In contrast, the Constitutional Court's decision indicates that the judge's determination
begins with and works off of the parties' agreement, either accepting or rejecting their assessment of the type of crime involved, the balancing of extenuating and aggravating circumstances, and the permissibility of suspending the sentence.
This challenge, regarding the reasoning of the judge, is a poignant example of the tension created by application of an accusatorial system, based on the control of the parties, to a system
constitutionally defined by the dominion of the judge at trial.
The decision of the Constitutional Court attempts to adhere to

judicial authorities." COST. art. 13(2).
12.' This is essentially what the Corte de Cassazione held. Cass., sez. un., 27 Mar.
1992.
126
Article 426 provides, inter alia, that a sentence must contain "a summary statement of the factual and legal reasons upon which the decision is based." C.P.P. art.
426(1)(d).
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the constitutional powers of the judge even though article 444
provides that the judge's assessment works from the agreement
of the parties as to both the facts and the punishment. In this
author's opinion, the strong language of th~ Constitutional Court
in support of the judicial role at trial masks the extent to which
the agreed upon sentence strips the judge of substantial power.
For instance, the opinion of the Constitutional Court does not expressly state the all-or-nothing position of the judge. The judge
must either accept the agreement of the parties in its entirety, or
reject it; the judge has no power to modify the request. This
further confirms the role of the judge, emphatically denied by the
Constitutional Court, as an entity simply to check the agreement
of the prosecutor and defendant.
Another aspect of the patteggiamento device -is the requirement
of consent by the prosecutor, which the 1981 law also mandated.
Despite the title of the device-"application of the punishment
agreed upon by the parties"-the articles governing this device
provide for the possibility that either party may invoke the procedure.127 Similar to the trial-avoidance procedure under the
1981 law, patteggiamento also requires the consent of the prosecutor. However, in contrast to the 1981 law (which did not provide for any review of the prosecutor's withholding of consent),
the 1989 code expressly provides that, upon completion of the
trial, if the trial court finds that the prosecutor's withholding of
consent was not justified, the court may impose the sentence
originally requested by the defendant. l28 This appears consistent with the 1984 Constitutional Court decision declaring that a
procedure for disposing of a case could not be forced upon the
prosecutor, and that the prosecutor's procedural choice could not
bind the judge's decision as to the appropriate punishment. 129
127 Article 444 refers to the "party who did not formulate the request." c.P.P. art.
444(2). "If the request is presented by one party [during the preliminary investigations],
the judge sets by decree a date by which the other part must express agreement or not."
c.P.P. art. 447(3).
128 c.P.P. art. 448(1).
129 Using a similar analysis, the Constitutional Court determined that such a challenge to article 448 was without basis. Corte cost., Mar. 29, 1993, n.127 (order of the
court).
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Thus, it appears that the drafters of the 1989 code were guided
by the 1984 Constitutional Court decision in providing for judicial review of a prosecutor's dissent and in permitting the defendant to gain the advantage of the sentence reduction upon conviction even when the prosecutor withheld consent. The drafters,
however, did not provide for similar review of a prosecutor's
withholding of consent to the other trial-avoidance mechanism
adopted by the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, giudizio
abbreviato (abbreviated or summary trial).

2. Abbreviated Trial
Patteggiamento has been dubbed bargaining as to the punishment, in contrast to giudizio abbreviato (abbreviated or summary
trial), which is called bargaining as to the procedure. While little
bargaining occurs under the device of application of the agreed
upon sentence, no bargaining is involved in giudizio abbreviato.
Rather, invocation of the procedure depends entirely on the initiative of the defendant, and requires no discussion with the
prosecutor, even though the prosecutor's consent is necessary.130 Upon the defendant's request and the prosecutor's consent, the judge must determine whether it is possible to dispose
of the case allo stato degli atti l31 (based upon the evidence thus
far accumulated}.132 If the judge determines that it is possible
to proceed under this mechanism, the case is disposed of at the
preliminary hearing, with the judge issuing the appropriate sentence. 133 Where the judge issues a sentence of conviction, the
punishment which would otherwise result is reduced by onethird. 134 Similar to the application of an agreed sentence, the
incentive for a defendant to invoke this summary procedure is a
reduction of the sentence if the defendant is ultimately convicted.

C.P.P. art. 438.
C.P.P. art. 440(1).
1"2 This means that the judge is to evaluate the case using the evidence in the
prosecutor's dossier, and neither party is to present additional evidence. However, a defendant might make a statement.
I,m
\.II

IH

C.P.P. art. 442.

114

C.P.P. 442(2).
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However, unlike application of the agreed upon sentence, which
is limited to situations where the final sentence does not exceed
two years, giudizio abbreviato may be requested without regard
to the final sentence imposed or to the type of crime charged, at
least as originally enacted. l35
The "typical" use of giudizio abbreviato occurs where, either
before or during the preliminary hearing, the defendant requests
the judge to dispose of the case this way by deciding the merits
of the case based on the evidence contained in the prosecutor's
dossier. Use of this procedure will result in a judicial decision on
the merits of the case in anticipation of trial, in contrast to the
agreed-upon sentence procedure where the judge simply decides
whether to accept the agreement of the prosecutor and defendant
as to the merits of the case and the ultimate sentence to be imposed. Thus, the nature of giudizio abbreviato requires active
participation by the judge on the merits of the case and not simply an evaluation of the parties' agreement.

Giudizio abbreviato may be invoked in other situations as well.
For example, the prosecutor may request that the case proceed
by one of the mechanisms which bypasses the preliminary hearing-giudizio direttissimo l36 (direct trial), or giudizio
immediato l37 (immediate trial). Where the judge has granted
such a request, the defendant may oppose this by requesting
giudizio abbreviato. l38 Pursuant to both of these procedures, a
case proceeds to trial on an accelerated basis by avoiding the
preliminary hearing. A prosecutor may invoke the direct trial
device where the defendant was arrested in flagrante, or where

13.' The Constitutional Court determined that the drafters of the 1989 code had exceeded their legislative mandate by providing that crimes punishable by life imprisonment could be disposed of by giudizio abbreviato, resulting in a reduced sentence of 30
years. Corte cost., Apr. 23, 1991, n.176, 1991 Foro It. I 2318.
136 C.P.P. arts. 449-452.
137 C.P.P. arts. 453-458.
I,.. See C.P.P. art. 452(2) (providing for the transformation of direct trial into abbreviated trial upon consent of the prosecutor and judge's decision that he or she may decide
the case based on the evidence in the prosecutor's dossier). See also C.P.P. art. 458 (providing that the defendant may request an abbreviated trial in opposition to the
prosecutor's request of immediate trial).
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the defendant confessed. 139 Immediate trial applies to situations where the evidence against the defendant is strong and the
judge for the preliminary investigations determines that the case
may be bound over for trial without the need for a preliminary
hearing. 14o Consistent with the purposes of the trial-avoidance
devices, giudizio abbreviato and application of an agreed-upon
sentence, these mechanisms for getting a case to trial faster are
intended to help unclog the criminal justice system by quickly
disposing of cases where the proof is relatively straightforward.
Permitting the defendant to request giudizio abbreviato would
resolve the cases even more efficiently than these other procedures by disposing of them in the preliminary hearing and avoiding a trial. The incentive for the defendant to make such a request is the prospect of a one-third sentence reduction in a situation where proof of guilt would be difficult to counter. Analogously, in the United States, these types of cases, where the defendant has been caught in the act or where there is otherwise
strong evidence of guilt, would likely result in a plea bargain
between the prosecutor and the defendant.
The above uses of giudizio abbreviato have been dubbed the
"atypical"141 version of the procedure since the defendant does
not make the request at the preliminary hearing, but rather in
opposition to one of the procedures that skip the preliminary
hearing and move the case straight to trial.
Despite the description of bargaining as to the procedure, use
of giudizio abbreviato, in either its typical or atypical version,
relies exclusively upon the initiative of the defendant; the prosecutor may not invoke the procedure. However, the consent of the
prosecutor is necessary under the law as originally enacted. The
articles setting out this summary procedure l42 do not expressly
indicate the effect of a prosecutor's decision to withhold consent
la" See C.P.P. 449(1) and (5). See also SERGIO RAMAJOLI,
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 104-05 (2d ed. 1996).
1111 [d. at 140.
141
See id. at 130. See
ABBREVIATO 125 (1995).
142
C.P.P. arts. 438-443.

also
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to the defendant's request. The report of the drafters of the code
acknowledges this omission, but explains that this trial avoidance device is one which does not involve the merits of the
charges. In contrast to application of the agreed-upon sentence,
where the defendant's request concerns not only the procedure
used but also the type of crime inyolved and the sentence to be
imposed, giudizio abbreviato involves only a procedural choice.
The report also points to the fact that the procedural choice by
the prosecutor is likely to involve a complex consideration of
various factors, making it difficult to set out in the abstract how
such a choice could be examined on review. Finally, the report
again emphasizes the mere procedural aspect of giudizio
abbreviato and its usefulness in unclogging the criminal justice
system to justify the "reward" of the one-third sentence reduction
for the defendant who requests the procedure. Absent this incentive, the device would be completely useless. Despite the reasoning of the drafting committee, the prosecutor's veto power in
giudizio abbreviato triggered constitutional challenges, similar to
the challenges made to the 1981 law and to the device of the
agreed-upon sentence.
In a series of sentences, the Constitutional Court examined the
effect of the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the defendant's
request of giudizio q,bbreviato. l43 In each of the three sentences,
the Constitutional Court determined that the discipline of
giudizio abbreviato, as enacted, was unconstitutional to the extent that it did not require the prosecutor to articulate reasons
for withholding consent to the defendant's request for the summary procedure. In addition, the court held that if the subsequent trial resulted in a conviction, and the judge determined
that the prosecutor's reasons for withholding consent were unfounded, the judge could grant the defendant the one-third sentence reduction. The result of these decisions was to add judicial
review of the prosecutor's withholding of consent to the procedure of summary trial. Also added was the possibility of a one-

..., See Corte cost., Feb. 8, 1990, n.66, 1990 Foro It. I 738; Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990,
n.183; Corte cost., Feb. 15, 1991, n.81, 36 Giur: cost. 559.
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third sentence reduction where, upon completion of the trial, the
judge determined that the prosecutor improperly withheld consent to the defendant's request for the abbreviated procedure. In
addition, the court extended this sentence involving the "typical"
application of giudizio abbreviato to the "atypical" instances.
That is, where the defendant requests giudizio abbreviato in
opposition to one of the procedures by which the case would
proceed directly to trial, the prosecutor's refusal to consent is
subject to the same form of judicial review, and the defendant is
entitled to a one-third sentence reduction upon a judicial determination that the prosecutor improperly withheld consent. 144
In the three sentences, the Constitutional Court relied on
article three of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees equality.145 In the first of the three sentences,146 the court compared giudizio abbreviato with application of agreed-upon punishment, and could find no justification for requiring the prosecutor to state reasons for his or her dissent to the latter, but not
the former. The court rejected the distinction made in the preliminary project report, stating that while giudizio abbreviato involves a choice of procedures, and no request or agreement as to
the nature of the facts or the appropriate punishment, the choice
has an effect on the sanction imposed, specifically, the one-third
sentence reduction upon conviction. The court emphasized its
reasoning in the subsequent sentences, still relying on the equality provision of the constitution, by delineating two aspects of
equality violated by the lack of judicial review of the prosecutor's
refusal to consent to the procedure.
The first aspect of equality is similar to the challenge made to
the 1981 law regarding substituted sanctions, requiring parity
between the defendant and the prosecutor at each stage of crimi-

144
Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990, n.183 (regarding the transformation from giudizio
direttissimo to giudizio abbreviatol.
I" "All citizens have equal social standing and are equal before the law without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or social or personal conditions."
COST. art. 3(1).
146
Corte cost., Feb. 8, 1990, n.66, 36 Giur. cost. (1991).
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nal proceedings. 147 While the Constitutional Court rejected this
challenge to the 1981 law, the court found a constitutional violation as to giudizio abbreviato. Under the 1981 law, the
prosecutor's withholding of consent could only preclude employment of the trial-avoidance device. Upon issuing a sentence of
conviction at the conclusion of the trial, the court could nonetheless decide that an alternative sanction was appropriate and
impose such a punishment. In contrast, the statutory scheme for
giudizio abbreviato provided for no such recoupment of the reduced sentence, thus putting the prosecutor in a position of superiority over that of the defendant, not due to the procedural
choice, but rather to the ultimate effect this would have on the
defendant's punishment if convicted. The court rejected arguments by the Avvocatura della Stato 148 in defense of the code
provisions that permitting judicial review of the prosecutor's
decision not to dispose of the case by the summary procedure
would amount to attributing powers to the judge which the drafters of the new code intended to deny. This argument is based on
the idea that a salient aspect of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure is the shift in control over the proceedings from the judge
to the parties, as an integral characteristic of an accusatory
system. The argument continues that the provisions for review of
the prosecutor's choice concerning application of the agreed-upon
sentence is necessary because the prosecutor's failure to consent
affects the merits of the case, that is, the qualification of the
crime involved as well as an evaluation of the aggravating and
extenuating circumstances. In contrast, the prosecutor's Ghoice
not to proceed by giudizio abbreviato has nothing to do with the
merits of the case, but simply indicates the procedural strategy
of the prosecutor. Again, for the Constitutional Court, the effect
of the choice on the ultimate sentence was sufficient to require

'47

'4.
States.

Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990, n.183.
Essentially, this person is the equivalent of the Attorney General in the United
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judicial review and the possibility of recouping the sentence reduction.
The second aspect of equality the court relied on was the fact
that similarly-situated defendants could receive markedly different sentences depending solely upon the unreviewable decision of
the prosecutor to agree to giudizio abbreviato in one case and not
the other. Although not discussed by the court, this holding is
consistent with Italian distrust of broad prosecutorial discretion
that could have arbitrary, inconsistent, and unpredictable results. The mere possibility that similarly-situated defendants
could receive different sentences probably would not have been
sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation, but where this possibility is attributable to an unreviewable decision by the prosecutor, the equality provision is a greater concern.
While the court found the above constitutional violation, the
court rejected other challenges to giudizio abbreviato which relied on other provisions of the constitution in the same vein as
the article three equality challenge. By reading into the statutory provisions the form of review discussed above, the court rejected other challenges based on the roles of the judge and prosecutor, similar to challenges made to both the 1981 substituted
sanction law and the device of application of the agreed-upon
sentence of the parties.
The Constitutional Court's analysis of these trial-avoidance
techniques illustrates the tensions and conflicts which these
devices generate between Italy's fundamental value of ascertaining the substantive truth in criminal matters and the practical
concern of relieving the clogged system. More specifically, these
procedures have required a greater definition of the roles of the
judges and prosecutors, and a refinement of the notion of equality between the defendant and the prosecutor.
C. Comparison to Plea Bargaining in the United States

As previously discussed, before the 1981 and 1989 legialation,
Italy relieved its overburdened criminal justice system by granting occasional amnesties. The practice of plea bargaining in the
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United States similarly began without a foundation in a legislative choice after deliberation on its advantages and disadvantages. In fact, commentators have described plea bargaining as the
result of ''backroom deals"149 and as part of an "invisible justice
system.,,150 By the time any branch of the government was
called upon to regulate it, the practice had become routine and
heavily relied upon by both prosecutors and defense attorneys.
Scholars disagree as to how long plea bargaining has been
around, with some claiming that the practice has always been a
part of criminal justice and others tracing its beginnings as recent as the middle of the nineteenth century.15I Regardless of
when and how plea bargaining originated, no one disputes that
it is the method by which the vast majority of criminal cases are
disposed of and that it is here to stay. This part of this Article
will not describe all or even most aspects of plea bargaining in
the United States, but will focus instead on issues raised by the
practice that are similar to the problems faced by the Italian
system. Comparison should lead to a better understanding of the
nature of plea bargaining and provide some direction to current
trends and reform movements in both countries. Of course, any
discussion of plea bargaining in the United States cannot assume only one system, insofar as each state, as well as the federal system, has its own method, perhaps codified, perhaps not, of
evaluating plea bargains. Therefore, when comparing the Italian
mechanisms to plea bargaining in the United States, this article
will speak in general terms.
Plea bargaining has been defined as "the exchange of official
concessions for a defendant's act of self-conviction,,,152 and, less
cynically, as the "give-and-take negotiation between the prosecu-

PiZZI & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 17.
BURTON ATKlNS & MARK POGREBIN, Introduction: Discretionary Declslon.Makmg
m the AdmmlStration of Justice, m THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE
LAw 1, 4 (Burton AtkIns & Mark Pogrebm eds., 1978).
151 For one detailed hlstoncal account, see Alschuler, supra note 24. See also, J.M.
BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 336 (1986) ("There was no plea bargammg
m felony cases m the eIghteenth century."); George Fisher, The Birth of the Pnson Retold,
104 YALE L.J. 1235 (1995).
"2 Alschuler, Plea Bargammg, supra note 24, at 3.
149

IIiO
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tion and defense, which [sic] arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power.,,153 At the center of plea bargaining is the
defendant's admission of guilt and waiver of a jury trial/ 54 as
well as other important rights. In exchange, the prosecutor
might promise one or more of the following: to drop certain
charges against the defendant, to reduce the offense charged to a
less serious offense, to make a certain sentencing recommendation, or not to oppose a sentence requested by the defendant. 155
Though the prosecutor might promise a certain sentence to be
imposed, that promise generally is not binding on the judge.
Nonetheless, only rarely does a judge reject the bargained sentence. In contrast, the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure does
not require that the defendant admit guilt, (perhaps more analogous to a plea of nolo contendere in the United States), but provides a statutorily prescribed one-third sentence reduction for
exercising such an option. Further, since the Code of Criminal
Procedure specifically provides for one-third sentence reduction,
the parties engage in little bargaining directly. Given the limits
on prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors in Italy cannot agree not
to pursue certain charges against the defendant. Reduction of
charges is limited to situations where the provision of the penal
code includes a separate sentence range for a less serious form of
the same offense. In such a situation, the prosecutor might agree
with the defense attorney that the particular facts of the case
make the offense less serious. This is somewhat similar to
"charge bargaining," but is best viewed as limited to instances
where the Italian Penal Code, within the same article, defines
the crime charged and includes a different, and lower, sentencing
provision for the same crime where extenuating circumstances
exist. Thus, depending on how a particular offense is set out in
the penal code, the prosecutor and defense attorney may have a
little more flexibility in "negotiating" the defendant's sentence. 156 This flexibility is limited, however, to the types of situBordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978).
John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. &
SOC'y REV. 261, 262-70 (1979).
I" See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(1).
".. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing example of receipt of stolen
15.1

1M
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ations outlined because an Italian prosecutor does not have the
discretion to charge the most serious offense in one article of the
penal code and then bargain down to a lesser offense under another article.
Judicial interpretations of both the Italian device of partyagreed sentences and U.S. plea bargaining are rather emphatic
that neither the prosecutor nor the parties can bind the judge's
decision on sentencing. In Italy, this is true because the constitution distinguishes between judicial and prosecutorial roles and
powers within the magistrate. 157 In the United States, it is due
to the doctrine of separation of powers, which similarly dictates
that the prosecutor is a figure of the executive branch, whose
responsibility is to enforce laws, while the judiciary is responsible for sentencing. 158 However, under both systems, as a practical matter, if judges do not accept-the sentences prosecutors have
promised, defendants will be discouraged from exercising this
option for disposing of charges against them. The Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure specifies that the judge must either accept or
reject the entire agreement of the parties. 159 This all-or-nothing
approach, along with the fact that the defendant's agreement
with the prosecutor does not include any admission of guilt,
ensures that the defendant does not risk a prejudicial increase in
sentence by the judge based on the mere fact that the defendant
requested this procedure but the request was not granted. In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a bargained sentence where a defendant claimed to have admitted
guilt solely due to the fear of facing a much more severe sentence, including the death penalty, if convicted at trial. 160 And
more recently, the Supreme Court has held that statements

goods).
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be'vested in a
Congress of the United States."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(holding that Congress' creation of the Sentencing Commission did not violate the separation of powers doctrine).
1119 C.P.P. art. 444(3).
160 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
Ir.7
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made by a defendant during unsuccessful plea negotiations may
be used to impeach the defendant at trial. 161 The effect of both
these aspects of plea bargaining is to encourage this method of
resolving criminal cases in the United States.

III.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

While the trial-avoidance devices of Italy were generally intended to mimic aspects of plea bargaining in the United States,
this article has pointed to a number of distinctions which stem
primarily from fundamental differences between the two systems, such as the strict limits on prosecutorial discretion in Italy. Interestingly, the drafters of the revised Code of Criminal
Procedure state up front that one of the goals is to include a
number of aspects of an accusatorial system. These new features
include trial-avoidance devices, indicating that the drafters believe that plea bargaining is part of an accusatorial system by
definition. In fact, there is little scholarly agreement as to
whether plea bargaining is more accusatorial or more inquisitorial. 162 On the one hand, plea bargaining includes the accusatorial notion of placing more control over the criminal proceedings in
the hands of the parties rather than in the judge. On the other
hand, plea bargaining also involves the consolidation of several
functions (charging, fact-finding, and sentencing) into one party,
the prosecutor. Probably the best analysis is that plea bargaining, on a theoretical level, is not characteristic of or endemic to
either model, but is simply an aberration which grew out of a
practical necessity, or at least a perceived necessity, to streamline the criminal justice system by disposing of a great majority
of cases without the time and expense of a trial. Certainly, it is
not necessary to label trial-avoidance mechanisms as indicative
of either model. Yet this stark utilitarian definition of plea bargaining poses difficulties in resolving the tensions and conflicts
the device creates between prosecutors and judges.

161
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United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
See supra note Ill.
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Both of the current Italian trial-avoidance devices were subjected to constitutional challenges based on the potential veto
power of prosecutors who refuse to consent to the defendant's
request for one of these procedures. 163 An analogous challenge
arose in the context of California's so-called "Three Strikes and
You're Out"l64 law. In People v. Romero/65 the defendant was
charged with what would have been his third felony, making him
eligible for an "indeterminate term of life imprisonment." The
information charging Romero with possession of 0.13 grams of
cocaine base also alleged the prior convictions of second degree
burglary, attempted burglary, first degree'burglary and two convictions based on possession of a controlled substance. Romero
initially pled not guilty. At a subsequent hearing, the defendant
changed his plea to guilty after the judge offered to strike the
prior convictions, subjecting Romero to a sentence from one to
six years. The prosecutor objected, arguing that the court could
not on its own dismiss prior felony convictions without the
prosecutor's consent. The judge nonetheless accepted the guilty
plea, struck the prior felony allegations from the record, and
sentenced Romero to six years imprisonment. Before the California Supreme Court, the defendant argued that requiring the
prosecutor's assent to striking the prior felonies would violate
the separation of powers doctrine166 by giving the prosecutor a
veto power over a court's decision to dismiss. The California
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's authority to dismiss prior
felonies sua sponte. The court's approach focused on the power to
dispose of properly filed criminal charges as a judicial function
and found that requiring the prosecutor's approval of such judicial action would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
This analysis is analogous to the Italian Constitutional Court's
analysis of the prosecutor's role in the trial-avoidance procedures
under the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure. Where a prosecutor
in Italy refuses to consent to one of the mechanisms discussed

,1<1 See supra text accompanying notes 66, 143.
,.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1997).
,6., 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
166 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 .
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above, the concern is with giving the prosecutor a veto power,
effectively binding the judge's sentencing decision. However, the
Italian Constitutional Court's resolution of this conflict between
the judge and prosecutor did not promote the goal of resolving
cases without a trial. Rather, the prosecutor's refusal to consent
blocks the use of the trial-avoidance mechanism, thereby requiring a trial. In contrast, the Romero holding furthers the disposition of cases without trial, even where this means that the goal
of the "Three Strikes" legislation is frustrated because a
"threepeat" offender will not serve an indeterminate life sentence.
Another example of the tensions between the roles of judges
and prosecutors relates to sentencing guidelines. 167 Commentators claim that such guidelines take the traditionally judicial
task of sentencing away from judges and place it in the hands of
prosecutors. 16B Specifically, by setting out severe mandatory
minimum sentences, narrowly defining appropriate situations for
departures, and leaving untouched the broad charging discretion
and the practice of plea negotiating, the guidelines give prosecutors a great deal of leverage in plea negotiations with defendants. 169 If convicted, the defendant faces a certain and much
stiffer sentence with little possibility of parole under sentencing
guidelines. 17o The parallel criticism of sentencing guidelines is
that they "turn thinking and feeling judges into robotic com put-

'67 By 1994, all 50 states and the federal government had adopted mandatory sentencing laws. Dale Parent et aI., Key Legislative Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory
Sentencing, Research in Action 1 (U.S. Dept. Of Justice!Nat'l Inst. Justice Nov. 1996).
''''' Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggre·
gation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) ("The sentencing reform movement has not restricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion from judges to
prosecutors.~).

,.. Id.; Thomas R. Burton, Enraged Over Punishment: One Judge's Call for Sentencing
Reform, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 167, 177 (1996) (reviewing LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO
PUNISH (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994»; Misner, supra note 25, at 756 (arguing that sentencing guidelines have increased the substantial amount of discretion which prosecutors already have); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1993) ("[C]ontrol over the charge is ... control of the sentence.").
'70
Burton, supra note 168, at 177-78.
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ers"l7l who must calculate the upward and downward departures mathematically. Within the context of plea bargaining, the
effect of sentencing guidelines is to substantially increase the
power and leverage of the prosecutor in whom the functions of
charging, fact-finding and sentencing are already collapsed,
while concomitantly diminishing the role of the judge to that of a
mere rubber-stamper.
As discussed earlier, there is a similar concern in Italy that

the judge's role is inappropriately reduced to that of a notary
under the trial-avoidance procedure of a party-agreed sentence.
Subsequent sentences of the Italian Constitutional Court achieve
a slightly better balance between these tensions by holding that
judges are still required to explain in writing their reasons for
accepting the proposed agreement of the parties. More important
is the fact that prosecutors in Italy do not have the broad charging discretion that prosecutors in the United States have. This
narrow charging discretion, coupled with the 1989 Code's division of functions between the prosecutor and judge, have the
effect of avoiding the collapse of roles into one player. This is
especially important in Italy where a significant result of the
1989 Code was to eliminate the role of the investigative judge
and give the prosecutor more of a role in the system as a party.
Therefore, while Italy has eliminated the monocratic and largely
unchecked power of the investigative judge, the United States
has enhanced the similarly unchecked power of a different player-the prosecutor-while still treating the prosecutor primarily
as an adversarial party. Once again, resolution of such tensions
in the United States results in the increased ability to dispose of
cases without trial, in contrast to that in Italy which results in
barriers to the avoidance of trial.
A final example of the tensions regarding the role of the prosecutor in the United States is where the defendant opts for a
judge trial. Of course, where a defendant pleads gmlty to a criminal charge, a jury trial is no longer necessary, but a defendant
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Harvey A. SHvergiate, Sentencing Guidelines, 37 BOSTON·B.J. 17 (1993).
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might waive the constitutional right to a jury trial without admitting guilt and opt for a bench trial. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that a defendant does not have
a correlative right to a bench trial in such a situation. 172 Thus,
the requirement under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
that the prosecutor and the judge consent to a judge trial 173
does not violate the constitution. 174 In addition, the Court held
that, given the government attorney's role as a "servant of the
law,,175 and the Court's "confidence in the integrity of the federal prosecutor,,,176 the prosecutor need not articulate reasons for
withholding consent to the defendant's waiver of a jury trial.
This analysis makes it difficult for a defendant to challenge the
prosecutor's refusal to dispose of the case by a judge trial. The
deference to the prosecutor's integrity and discretion in this
situation is significant to this comparison of mechanisms for
streamlining the criminal justice systems in Italy and the United
States because one potential advantage of a judge trial is that
the defendant might be subjected to a less severe sentence based
on the savings in judicial resources. I77 Certainly, scholars have
noted that such a perception exists. 178 Therefore, although
there is no specific statutory basis for reducing the sentence of a
defendant who has foregone a trial by jury, like there is in Italy,
there exists at least this possibility of a reduced sentence. Yet,
the largely unreviewable power of the prosecutor to refuse to
consent to the defendant's request could deprive the defendant of
such a sentencing benefit. As discussed earlier, the Italian Constitutional Court has determined that while the prosecutor can
block the use of an abbreviated procedure, a prosecutor's improper dissent cannot deny the defendant the benefits of the statutoSinger v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
174
Interestingly, in the context of court-martials the prosecutor's consent is not necessary for a bench trial. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Rule for Courts-Martial
[R.C.M.J 903(c)(2) (1995).
m Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (quoting. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935».
17. Id.
177
Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 37 n.187 (quoting Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1051 (1984».
'" Id.
172

17.1
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ry one-third sentence reduction. Thus, subjecting the prosecutor's
refusal to consent to judicial review is a type of "check" typical of
the accusatorial model of criminal justice.
More interesting, however, is that the Supreme Court in Singer based its determination that the prosecutor need not articulate reasons for refusing to consent on the notion that the prosecutor "is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a 'servant of
the law' with a 'twofold aim . . . that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.",179 This description of the prosecutor as an
impartial party to the case hints of aspects of an inquisitorial
system and raises the question of the proper conception of the
prosecutor's role. The criminal justice system in the United
States is an adversarial model which emphasizes the importance
and control of the parties, yet a prosecutor also has the "respon:'
sibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.'H80 Analogously, in Italy prosecutors and judges come under the umbrella title of Magistrati (magistrates).181 Even after
adoption of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor
and judge both continue to be considered members of the judicial
branch, in contrast to a prosecutor in the United States who is
separate from the judge, and an arm of the executive branch.
The blurring of the prosecutor's role in the language and reasoning used by the Court in Singer is inconsistent with the fact that
the prosecutor is not a member of the judicial branch. Similarly,
implementing a criminal justice system which emphasizes the
adversarial role of the parties, where one of the parties, the
prosecutor, is a magistrate, has given rise to the same types of
tensions in Italy. The concern is framed in terms of the appearance of impropriety of a player who should be an adversary
against the defendant, yet forms part of the branch of the government which is to be impartial in deciding the defendant's
guilt or innocence.

\79

Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935».

1110

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995).

1"1

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Recently, an Italian senator proposed a law which would separate the careers of judges and prosecutors. 182 If passed, prosecutors would no longer come under the umbrella title of
magistrati and would have to pursue a different career path and
pass different entrance exams than judges. Just as the drafters
of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure looked to the United
States, this proposed law was inspired by the aspect of criminal
justice in the United States which does not place the prosecutor
within the judicial branch of the government. One common complaint of Italian defense attorneys is that under the current
system an individual who has served as a prosecutor (on one side
of the bench) might suddenly become a judge and serve on the
other side of the bench. This is especially troubling now that the
1989 Code of Criminal Procedure has placed prosecutors in the
role of advocates. Where one comes to the bench with the background of having acted as an advocate for the state in prosecuting criminal defendants, the fear is that this person will necessarily be biased against criminal defendants. In the United
States, however, many judges come to the bench with lengthy
experience as prosecutors or criminal defense attorneys since it
is rare for graduating law students to directly pursue a judgeship. Perhaps Italy should consider flexible provisions which
would give criminal defense attorneys a more realistic opportunity of becoming judges after a career in defense work. Currently,
a person must be under the age of 35 to qualify for the examinations for magistrati. Typically, those who have gone into criminal
defense work are too early in their careers to consider a change.
The possibility of eliminating such an age restriction and opening up the judiciary to defense attorneys might be less offensive
than depriving prosecutors of their status, and might avoid the
politically charged question of whether prosecutors would then
become a completely independent and autonomous branch of the
government or, conversely, dependent upon the executive. 183

'"2 Disegno di legge, Sept. 30, 1996, n. 1383.
11<:< This issue is not as politically charged in Italy because there, as well as in other
civil law countries, state power is viewed with a greater degree of trust than in the United States. William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:

1997]

AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE?

467

One scholar has already cautioned against calls for reform of
the prosecutor's role in the United States based on examples
from civil law countries, mainly because the cultural, historical
and political differences pose formidable barriers to the effectiveness of such reforms. lM Similarly, attempts to reform the role
of prosecutors in Italy should be approached with caution. Such
caution is not based solely on the fact that the traditions and
cultures of the countries are different and that these differences
are reflected in the prosecutor's role, but is based on a more
practical level. That is, were Italy to separate prosecutors from
the judicial branch, ethical responsibilities would nonetheless
curb the potential for a passionately adversarial prosecutory role
and, thus, not avoid the tension of conflicting roles the 1989
Code of Criminal Procedure places on prosecutors. The Italian
Code of Ethics requires magistrati and also, specifically,
prosecutors, to act impartially, to direct their investigations toward determining the truth, to acquire evidence favorable to the
defendant, and not to keep such evidence from the judge. ls5
This consideration of the duties and roles of the prosecutor is
important in the context of the trial-avoidance procedures of the
1989 Code of Criminal Procedure because the creation of an
independent branch of prosecutors, as well as any expansion of
the use of trial-avoidance procedures, could eventually lead to
greatly increased prosecutorial discretion. This author cautions
Italian lawmakers to avoid the replacement of one monocratic
and largely autonomous player, the investigative judge, by another, the prosecutor.
The historic mixture of adversarial and nonadversarial characteristics implemented by the 1989 Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure are reflective of that country's concern with the impo-

The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1325, 1338 (1993).
II« Id. at 1373.
1M CODICE ETICO [C.E.] art. 13 (addressing the "conduct of the public prosecutor") in
Eraldo Stefani, L'ACCERTAl\1ENTO DELLA VERITA IN DIBA'ITIMENTO [Ascertainment of
Truth at Trial] app. at 261 (1995). See also Stefani, supra note 42, at 34 (noting the conflicting roles and duties imposed upon the prosecutor).
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sition of checks on abuses of power by dividing the functions of
the players and the phases of the disposition of a criminal case.
In order to ensure justice, though perhaps not the discovery of
substantive truth, such checks need to be present even in the
disposition of cases without trial. In the United States, due to
the broad discretion of the prosecutors, limits and checks are
easily circumvented,186 thus making it extremely difficult to
"tame the dragon.,,187 However, where Italy has taken small
and tentative steps toward trial-avoidance procedures it might be
possible to add gradually to the powers of prosecutors allowing
for an evaluation each step of the way. At the same time, however, restrained broadening of trial-avoidance procedures is likely
to impede rapid relief from case backlog in Italy. Thus, it seems
that despite the serious need for quick disposition of cases,188 it
is unlikely that Italian criminal courts will see much decrease in
caseloads. Nonetheless, this cautious approach to reform in order
to ensure that checks on the process are maintained may well
lead to other types of proposals which do not focus only on the
role of the judge or prosecutor or on the ability to dispose of
cases without trial. For example, commentators have suggested
decriminalizing some activities currently defined as crimes. 189
CONCLUSION

While Italian lawmakers struggle with the tensions between
the traditional purpose of a criminal justice system to determine
the truth and the need to dispose of cases efficiently, they should
look carefully at the current trends in the United States and see
the potential dangers of consolidating tremendous power in the
prosecutor. They should view the beginnings of incremental reform as an opportunity to maintain control and to consider an
''''' See supra note 29 for citations to evaluations of various attempts to curb plea
bargaining.
'"' See, e.g., Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administratiue Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976).
,M Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 6.

,"4 TIZIANA TREVISSON LUPACCHINI, NATURA ED EFFE'ITI DELLA SENTENZA CHE
APPLICA LA PENA SU RICHIESTA DELLE PARTI (1996).
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array of possible approaches. In fact, the variety of expediting
procedures under the 1989 Code are indicative of their creative
abilities. 190 Thus, it may be that Italy will eventually answer
the question of whether plea bargaining is inevitable191 in criminal justice systems reflective of liberal democratic ideals in the
negative, and refuse to accept the widespread use of plea bargaining as it currently exists in the United States.

See supra note 92.
See Schulhofer, supra note 177, at 1037 (challenging ide~ that plea bargaining is
unavoidable in the United States).
190
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